Old alliances and a new reality: why Armenia is drifting away from the CSTO

Today in Moscow, at the summit of the heads of state of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the question of stripping Armenia of its right to vote in the organization's bodies over arrears in membership dues will be considered.
This was announced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Yerevan is also losing the opportunity to nominate candidates for quota positions within the CSTO.
At the same time, as the Russian minister emphasized, even after such a decision is adopted, Armenia will effectively retain all the main rights under the collective security treaty, including the right to collective security itself. In other words, the CSTO charter does not provide for a mechanism to expel a state from the organization, and as long as Armenia remains its member, the corresponding obligations toward it remain in force.
The day before, on the sidelines of the joint session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Council of Defense Ministers and the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils of the CSTO member states, Lavrov stated that the organization does not intend to "throw out" Armenia. "…Statements that the CSTO no longer meets Armenia's interests, since it does not ensure Armenia's needs in the sphere of security... Well, if that is so, then one must withdraw. But if they want us to expel Armenia — we will not do that," he said. According to the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Yerevan has not submitted an official statement on withdrawal, and the Armenian leadership's statements about the uselessness of the CSTO so far remain words unsupported by documents.
The reason for the current restrictive measures was Armenia's arrears in membership dues. As Lavrov reported earlier, Yerevan has not been transferring them since 2024, that is, for more than two years. In this connection, the question was raised of applying Article 25 of the CSTO Charter, which provides for corresponding measures regarding states that do not fulfill their financial obligations to the organization.
According to this article, "in the event that member states fail to fulfill obligations to repay debt to the organization's budget within two years, the Council shall adopt a decision to suspend the right to nominate citizens of that state for quota positions within the organization, as well as to deprive it of the right to vote in the organization's bodies until the debt is fully repaid." Thus, formally Armenia continues to remain a member of the CSTO alongside Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, despite the de facto freezing of its participation.
Meanwhile, in Yerevan itself no practical steps are being taken so far to withdraw from the organization. As Armenian media reported, citing a member of the parliamentary standing committee on defense and security issues, Gegham Manukyan, there are no corresponding initiatives in the legislature. The topic is heard primarily in statements by representatives of the ruling party and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
In early November, the Armenian prime minister stated that he favors the country's expulsion from the CSTO and would be pleased if such a decision were taken by the organization itself. "I would like us to record once and for all that our interest in the CSTO is exhausted, we no longer have interests connected with the CSTO," Pashinyan said. According to him, Armenia's expulsion would spare Yerevan the need to make a difficult decision on withdrawal on its own. Earlier, the head of the Armenian government had already announced that relations between Armenia and the CSTO had passed the point of no return.
It is telling that on the day of the Moscow CSTO summit, Pashinyan is in Turkey, where he is taking part in the Leaders' Summit of the 31st session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP31).
However, the current state of affairs has not come as a surprise. Armenia has been consistently distancing itself from the organization for several years now. In February 2024, Yerevan officially announced the freezing of its participation in the CSTO and stopped paying membership dues, and already in the spring of that year it initiated the process of European integration.
It is precisely the aspiration for rapprochement with the European Union that has become one of the key factors in the cooling of Armenia's relations with its long-standing allies. Another stage of this course was Pashinyan's working visit to Brussels in early November. There he took part in the 2026 EU enlargement summit under the motto "The Future of Europe," organized by the Euronews television company, and held a number of bilateral meetings with the leadership of European institutions. During the visit, the Armenian prime minister stated that Yerevan intends to officially submit an application to join the European Union as early as 2027 or 2028.
But perhaps the key stage of the rapprochement process was the first-ever bilateral Armenia-EU summit, held on May 5 in Yerevan. Moreover, the parties' interaction had long before that gone beyond political dialogue and extended to the military sphere. Thus, on July 23, 2024, the European Union for the first time approved the provision of 10 million euros to Armenia from the European Peace Facility, and on January 30, 2026 — another 20 million euros. In March of this year, Yerevan approached the EU for a third package of financial assistance.
However, Armenia's gradual distancing from the CSTO is explained not only by political disagreements with its former allies or the intensification of contacts with Brussels. No less significant is the change in the strategic environment in the South Caucasus after the end of the long-standing conflict and the formation of a fundamentally new system of regional relations.
At the heart of this transformation are a peace agenda, regional stability, economic integration and the development of transport connectivity. The security architecture is increasingly being supplemented by economic and infrastructure mechanisms of cooperation. And the main initiator of the formation of this new regional reality is Azerbaijan.
An important milestone on this path was the signing on August 8, 2025 in Washington of the Joint Declaration by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the initialing by the two countries' foreign ministers of the text of the peace agreement.
Of course, Armenia still has to resolve a fundamental issue — to remove from its constitution the provision containing territorial claims against Azerbaijan. At the same time, the development of the peace process already testifies to a transition to a new model of bilateral relations.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly emphasized that peace with Armenia has de facto been achieved and that now it is necessary to work on strengthening it. In this direction, Baku has taken a number of concrete steps: it lifted restrictions on the transit of goods through its territory to Armenia and began supplying critically important energy resources, the volumes of which are measured in tens of thousands of tons. In the current geopolitical situation, these decisions acquire special significance.
No less important a role is played by transport infrastructure development projects designed to strengthen connectivity not only of the South Caucasus but of the broader region. Among them is TRIPP, whose implementation opens up for Armenia prospects of overcoming the consequences of many years of isolation, gaining access to new trade routes, attracting investment and joining regional logistics chains.
Another practical step in this direction was taken on November 7. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Brendan Hanrahan, Armenian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Vahan Kostanyan and Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov announced the launch of trilateral technical groups for planning the advancement of the TRIPP route — the "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity."
As noted in a joint statement published on the website of the U.S. State Department, the first two trilateral groups will focus on issues of transport and electricity transmission. Their task is to move from political agreements to working out the technical solutions needed to implement the project and link it with other elements of regional infrastructure. The parties also confirmed their intention to promptly agree upon and put into effect all the modalities of TRIPP.
Thus, a new system of relations is gradually taking shape in the South Caucasus, in which economic interdependence, transport communications and diplomatic settlement are acquiring ever greater importance. It is obvious that against this backdrop the military-political alliances that previously determined Armenia's foreign policy orientations are losing their former significance for Yerevan. And a possible restriction of rights within the CSTO is hardly likely to become a factor capable of changing this course.
Today, Armenia's formal membership in the organization is increasingly at odds with its actual foreign policy line. As ties with the European Union deepen and involvement in new regional processes grows, maintaining the previous balance will become ever more difficult. Therefore, the question of Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO is gradually becoming not so much a matter of political choice as a matter of time.











