The Yemeni front becomes part of the larger war around Iran

The war in Yemen, which had remained relatively quiet after the truce was established in 2022, is once again turning into one of the most dangerous flashpoints of Middle Eastern instability.

Recent developments show that this is no longer just another local escalation between the Houthis and the forces supporting Yemen's internationally recognized government. Against the backdrop of the ongoing war around Iran, the Yemeni front is becoming ever more closely tied to a broader confrontation in which the interests of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United States intersect.

The turning point was the Houthis' capture of the port city of Mokha on the Red Sea coast on September 10. Government forces subsequently withdrew south toward the Dhubab area, while the Houthis advanced in the direction of the Hanish Islands. This became the movement's most significant territorial success in recent years.

At the same time, Houthi politburo member Mohammed al-Bukhaiti stated that three brigades of Saudi forces and their allies had surrendered along with their weapons and equipment in the directions of Hays, Mokha, Al-Khokha, Taiz, and Al-Jawf. There is no independent confirmation of this information, so it should be viewed precisely as a statement by one of the parties to the conflict.

The military dynamic takes on particular importance because of geography. Mokha is located directly on one of the world's most important maritime routes, and a further Houthi advance toward Dhubab and Perim could create a threat to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. At the same time, reports of the capture of Perim have not yet received reliable independent confirmation.

Why Bab el-Mandeb has found itself at the center of events

Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and serves as the southern gateway of the Asia–Europe route through the Suez Canal. Therefore, any serious deterioration of the situation here could have repercussions far beyond Yemen — on shipping, insurance, energy markets, and international trade.

Control over Mokha does not yet mean control over the strait, but the advance toward Dhubab and the Hanish Islands changes the military configuration of the coastline. If the Houthis gain the ability to systematically affect the movement of vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb area, the cost and safety of shipping through the Red Sea will come under additional pressure.

The movement has already issued a corresponding political signal. The Houthis announced a blockade of shipping linked to Saudi Arabia, while their representative Mohammed Abdulsalam stated that international shipping as a whole remains safe and that the actions are directed against specific Saudi vessels.

The threat, moreover, concerns not only theoretical prospects. The International Maritime Organization had earlier recorded dozens of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea area since 2024, and in August 2026 an attack off the coast of Yemen led to the deaths of crew members and rescuers.

The Iranian factor

The main question now is how closely the Yemeni escalation is linked to the broader war around Iran. Tehran officially denies directly steering the Houthis' actions, but there have previously been repeated reports of arms supplies, financing, and advisory support from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force. At the same time, the Houthis themselves retain their own political and military interests and cannot be reduced entirely to the role of an externally controlled formation.

Today Iran called for an end to the Saudi blockade of Yemen and for the resumption of negotiations, emphasizing the need to respect Yemen's sovereignty and declaring Tehran's readiness to support the negotiation process. Such a position allows Iran simultaneously to demonstrate political support for the Yemeni side and to offer a diplomatic way out of the conflict.

For Iran, the Yemeni direction represents an additional instrument of pressure on Saudi Arabia and at the same time an opportunity to influence one of the most important maritime routes without entering into direct military confrontation with Riyadh on its own territory.

This becomes especially sensitive against the backdrop of the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz. If tensions persist simultaneously in the northern and southern directions — in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb — the risks to global trade and energy increase many times over. In that case, the region acquires two potential bottlenecks at once for the movement of oil and goods.

In this sense, the importance of the Yemeni direction for Tehran is growing precisely now: pressure on Bab el-Mandeb complements the crisis around Hormuz, creating a threat to two key maritime chokepoints at once on opposite sides of the Arabian Peninsula.

Saudi Arabia faces a difficult choice

For Riyadh, what is happening has several dimensions at once. On the one hand, Houthi attacks directly threaten the kingdom's territory. On September 8, according to Saudi authorities, 73 people were injured as a result of the attacks, with strikes hitting, among other things, energy infrastructure facilities in Abha, Najran, Jizan, and Khamis Mushait.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has no interest in turning the Yemeni conflict into a full-scale regional war whose consequences could prove more severe than the problem on its southern border itself.

It is precisely here that the most difficult fork in the road for Riyadh emerges. On September 10, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke twice with Donald Trump and, according to Reuters citing American officials and Axios, urged the United States to strike the Houthis. Trump declined direct American military intervention. Instead, Washington intends to strengthen its support for Saudi Arabia, and the head of U.S. Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper, headed to the kingdom for urgent coordination.

In parallel, Saudi Arabia is seeking the formation of an international coalition to protect shipping in the Red Sea. This shows that Riyadh is striving to resolve the problem primarily through an expansion of the regional and international security system, without drawing the United States into yet another direct military campaign.

Riyadh also faces the practical task of maintaining exports. If traffic through the Red Sea is disrupted, the importance of alternative routes grows, in particular the export of oil through the Saudi port of Yanbu. This makes it possible to reduce dependence on individual maritime chokepoints, but it does not eliminate the overall risk of more expensive logistics.

The scale of the problem is already affecting the kingdom's oil industry itself. According to data submitted by Saudi Arabia to OPEC, production in August amounted to about 6.2 million barrels per day — 23% less than the July level and the country's lowest monthly figure in 2026. Crude oil exports fell to approximately 3.1 million barrels per day versus 5.1 million in July — the lowest level since at least 2013. The restrictions are connected, among other things, with Houthi threats to the western coast and reduced opportunities to use the route through Yanbu.

Turkey and Pakistan enter the equation

Additional complexity is created by a new military-political factor. In August, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan concluded a mutual defense agreement. On September 10, however, Islamabad stated that the question of a military response under this agreement had not yet been discussed, although Pakistan warned Iran of the need to restrain the Houthis and confirmed its support for Saudi Arabia's security.

At the same time, an important clarification emerged around the agreement. On September 9, Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated that attacks on Saudi Arabia could potentially lead to the invocation of the Mecca agreement. The very next day, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry clarified that a specific military response under the treaty was not yet being discussed, although Islamabad confirmed its readiness to fulfill its terms if necessary.

Thus, Riyadh is gaining a potentially broader system of support, but its application in the Yemeni conflict would automatically raise the stakes. For Turkey and Pakistan, direct involvement would mean moving from political support for Saudi Arabia to participation in yet another regional confrontation.

Ankara finds itself in a particularly difficult position: it maintains relations with Saudi Arabia while at the same time seeking to preserve its own channels of interaction with Iran. Therefore, an expansion of the Yemeni war creates a serious foreign policy risk for Turkey.

What is changing for the region

The current situation shows that the conflict is gradually moving beyond the traditional framework of "the Houthis versus the Saudi coalition." It simultaneously involves a struggle for Yemeni territory, a confrontation around Iran and Saudi Arabia, a threat to international shipping, and competition over the resilience of energy routes.

Moreover, the consequences already have a pronounced humanitarian dimension. According to the World Health Organization, between August 23 and September 5, 194 people were killed as a result of the new round of hostilities in Yemen, more than 880 were wounded, and over 21,000 people were forced to leave their homes. These figures relate to the period preceding the capture of Mokha, so a further deterioration of the situation could mean an even greater scale of population displacement.

For the countries of the region, this means a rising cost of any mistake. A strike on an energy facility, an attack on a tanker, or an expansion of the combat zone could cause consequences that will no longer be possible to confine within Yemen's borders.

It is no coincidence that the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, told the Security Council that the country is entering a "new and more dangerous phase," separately pointing to the risks to shipping in the area of the vitally important strait.

Against this backdrop, the oil market is already reacting to the general instability. On September 10, Brent closed trading at around $107.6 per barrel after rising by more than 6%, and in subsequent trading the price climbed to approximately $109. Thus, the previous estimate of $105.6 no longer reflects the latest market movements.

Where is Azerbaijan in all this

For Azerbaijan, the consequences of what is happening have a dual character. On the one hand, higher oil prices can support export revenues. On the other, the rising cost of maritime shipping and insurance creates additional inflationary pressure, while the deterioration of the situation on key routes increases overall economic uncertainty.

If the risks around the Red Sea and the Suez route persist, business interest in alternative overland directions between Asia and Europe will grow. In this context, the Middle Corridor through Central Asia, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, and further through Turkey acquires additional strategic significance.

Of course, the Middle Corridor is not capable of replacing the Suez Canal in terms of shipping volumes. Its advantage lies elsewhere: it provides an additional route that makes it possible to diversify logistics at a time when maritime communications are becoming less predictable. For Baku, this creates an opportunity to strengthen its own role in the Eurasian transport architecture simultaneously with the development of energy cooperation.

Several of Azerbaijan's interests converge here — the stability of the Caspian region, the reliability of ties with Central Asia and Turkey, the development of transport infrastructure, and the preservation of predictable relations with neighbors. Amid growing uncertainty around traditional routes, the importance of reliable alternatives is increasing.

The second front of a big war

The main conclusion of the current Yemeni escalation is that the geography of the war around Iran is gradually expanding. Its consequences are manifested no longer in a single theater of military operations, but in a system of interconnected crises — from Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to energy markets and international trade.

Therefore, the question today is no longer so much whether the Houthis will manage to hold Mokha or advance further toward Bab el-Mandeb. Much more important is whether the Yemeni direction will become a permanent element of a broader regional confrontation.

If a further Houthi advance leads to a sustained threat to maritime communications, the consequences will be felt far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. For Saudi Arabia this is a question of security, for Iran an additional instrument of pressure, for Turkey and Pakistan a difficult choice about the degree of involvement, for the global economy a new risk factor, and for Azerbaijan simultaneously an economic challenge and an opportunity to enhance the importance of its own transport and energy links.

That is precisely why the Yemeni front today should be viewed not as a separate conflict in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, but as one of the nodes of a far larger confrontation, in which the security of sea routes is gradually becoming as important a part of geopolitics as territory, military power, and control over energy resources.