Ankara's hasty step: why the illusion of opening the Armenian border may cost Turkey too dearly
Opening a border is a technical task. Turning that step into an instrument of political influence is far more difficult.
Turkey can restore communication with Armenia, expand trade, and revive its border regions. But if Ankara expects that this will automatically strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus, it should take a closer look at regional reality. Economic benefits are possible, yet political dividends are not guaranteed. And an attempt to obtain them while ignoring Azerbaijan's interests could turn into a strategic miscalculation.
In Turkey's expert and political circles, expectations of a breakthrough in normalization with Armenia have once again come to the fore, which, as Ankara believes, would help improve relations with the West and open up a new regional market. However, a systemic analysis shows that such expectations rest on a superficial assessment of Armenia's potential. An attempt to act independently of Baku will not give Ankara any lasting political advantages, but will inevitably create systemic tension in the alliance with Azerbaijan, which is key for Turkish foreign policy.
An economic mirage: real figures and a dead-end market
The main argument of those who advocate the accelerated opening of the border, in particular through the "Margara / Alican" checkpoint, is built on promises of economic revival for Turkey's northeastern provinces — Kars, Igdir, and Ardahan. However, an elementary analysis of macroeconomic indicators turns these hopes to dust. Armenia is an extremely limited, dead-end market with a gross domestic product of about $24 billion and an actual population of fewer than 2.9 million people. The purchasing power of this market is insignificant, and key sectors of the economy — from energy and logistics to communications and the banking sector — are under the direct or indirect control of foreign capital, mainly Russian.
Armenia's economic indicators make it possible to assess the market Turkey is counting on. According to Armenia's Statistical Committee, in January–August 2026 the republic's foreign trade turnover amounted to $13.27 billion, an increase of 3.2% compared to the same period last year. Exports fell by 6.5%, to $4.62 billion, while imports grew by 9.3%, to $8.65 billion. Armenia needs imported supplies, but these figures in themselves give no grounds to believe that Turkish companies will gain exclusive advantages against the backdrop of recent foreign policy and foreign economic trends.
The geography of trade is even more telling. In the first eight months of 2026, Armenia's trade turnover with Russia amounted to about $3.59 billion, down 19.2% year-on-year. Russia's share in Armenia's total foreign and mutual trade decreased from 34.5% to 27%. At the same time, trade with the European Union grew by 53.9%, reaching $2.43 billion, and the EU's share increased from 12.3% to 19%. Trade turnover with China rose by 31%, to $2.18 billion.
At the same time, the structural dead end of the Armenian economy has not gone anywhere. Despite the redistribution of shares, key infrastructure remains rigidly tied to fixed commitments. It is enough to look at the country's main artery — the railway. The South Caucasus Railway CJSC manages all of Armenia's railway infrastructure on the basis of a concession agreement that runs until 2038. The recent public friction between Yerevan and Moscow over the railways ended quite symptomatically: the Armenian authorities were forced to acknowledge that there was no alternative to this management arrangement, and agreed to a compromise. Any cargo that could potentially go from Turkey to Armenia overland inevitably falls under the tariff and infrastructure control of the existing operators.
In the final analysis, the entire economic breakthrough for Turkey will come down to supplies of cheap textiles, food products, and building materials for Armenian border villages, as well as local shuttle tourism. The income from this for the Turkish economy, with its GDP exceeding a trillion dollars, will amount to a statistical error — no more than hundredths of a percent. To count on this meager flow to offset the political costs is a profound delusion.
False hopes for "Western applause" and a lobbying dead end
Ankara's second argument is diplomatic. There is a notion in the Turkish establishment that a unilateral step toward Yerevan would instantly improve Turkey's image in Washington, Brussels, and Paris, neutralizing the pressure of the Armenian diaspora. This is a manifestation of a surprising ignorance of the nature of Armenian diaspora politics. Organizations such as ANCA in the United States or CCAF in France were historically and institutionally created with one single goal — opposition to Turkey. Hatred of the Turkish state is not a consequence of closed borders, but the fundamental meaning of the existence of these institutions, providing them with political influence and funding.
The opening of the borders will not make diaspora functionaries change their rhetoric. On the contrary, it will be perceived as a sign of Ankara's weakness, the result of many years of pressure on it, and a signal to put forward new demands on Turkey. Moreover, the geopolitical environment has changed fundamentally. If fifteen or twenty years ago, in the era of the 2009 Zurich Protocols, the West did indeed exert systemic pressure on Ankara, demanding that Armenia be unblocked, today this issue has dropped off its list of priorities. Preoccupied with global crises, the West will not grant Turkey any preferences for this step. Ankara will give away a strategic trump card absolutely free of charge, receiving in return neither progress on European integration nor concessions on key defense programs. The American ban on F-35 deliveries, CAATSA sanctions, and the stalling of F-16 deals are tied to the presence of Russian S-400 systems and to strict U.S. legislation, while Berlin's embargo on the purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets is conditioned by Ankara's position on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, but in no way by the closed Armenian border.
An incorrect geopolitical calculation: Baku's agency versus Yerevan's weakness
The main mistake of Turkish strategists consists, strange as it may seem, in an incorrect assessment of the balance of power in the Caucasus itself. Today's Armenia is a state with extremely weak agency, torn apart by an internal political crisis. To try to increase one's influence in the region through working with Yerevan is like building a house on sand.
Azerbaijan, on the contrary, has in recent years turned into the unconditional military-political and economic leader of the South Caucasus. Baku controls key energy and transport arteries, from which Turkey has for many years derived not hypothetical but quite real benefits. Direct Azerbaijani investments in the Turkish economy through the SOCAR company alone exceed $20 billion. Azerbaijan is the largest investor in Turkish energy and industry, the owner of the Petkim petrochemical complex and the STAR refinery.
A comparison of possible gains and real losses makes the recklessness of this idea obvious. On one side of the scale lies local bargaining at the expense of petty trade worth tens of millions of dollars a year, illusory praise from individual foreign officials, and an attempt to enter the market of a country with zero political weight. On the other side of the scale is the guaranteed threat of a revision of SOCAR's investment programs, the rupture of the Baku–Ankara strategic axis, the degradation of the provisions of the Shusha Declaration, a weakening of the coordination of military-industrial complexes, and a decline in Turkey's authority throughout the Turkic world. After all, with the loss of Azerbaijan, Turkey will lose its only real entrance to Central Asia. Consequently, without Azerbaijan there will be no Turkic world at all.
If Ankara proceeds with a separate opening of the border with Armenia before Yerevan signs a final peace treaty with Baku, including constitutional changes excluding Armenia's territorial claims against Azerbaijan, Baku's reaction will be commensurate. Azerbaijani society, despite its great affection for Turkey, may perceive this step of hers as a betrayal of national interests.
Lessons of the past and the price of a strategic miscalculation
Ankara already made a similar mistake in 2009 when signing the Zurich Protocols. At that time, the attempt to play behind Baku's back brought Turkey the deepest crisis in relations with Azerbaijan and ended in the complete failure of the protocols themselves. It took years of intense work to restore trust and reach the level of the 2021 allied declaration. A repetition of this mistake today would look not merely like going around the same vicious circle, but like a deliberate strategic miscalculation of Turkish foreign policy in the Caucasus direction.
If Ankara yields to illusions and opens the border with Armenia autonomously, Turkey will instantly lose its lever of pressure on Yerevan, which will no longer have any incentive to meet Baku's demands. In turn, Azerbaijan will likely revise the format of cooperation, putting talk of a unified foreign policy on pause and intensifying its multi-vector ties with Israel, Central Asia, and the Arab world without Ankara's participation.
Turkey will receive nothing from Armenia except minor economic crumbs and another round of demands. But the price it will have to pay for this illusory breakthrough — the loss of trust and allied relations with Azerbaijan — will unquestionably be far higher. A smart strategy requires Ankara to show patience: the border with Armenia should be opened only together with a final peace, the key to which is in Baku.
Farhad Huseyn
